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Abstract: The debate about developmental states raises numerous conceptual and 
contextual questions. Beginning with a critical reflection on the export of 
„developmental states model‟ from Asia to Africa, this paper—which considers the 
emergence of developmental states—explores questions of increasing significance 
across Sub-Saharan Africa: What might “developmental states model” actually mean 
in post-colonial Africa? How much component does the concept of developmental states 
have? How can we relate this discussion about each developmental state within the 
wider debate about developmental states in Sub-Saharan Africa? How does it engage 
with local cultures and civil society? This article addresses these questions by 
providing the conceptual explanations of developmental states as well as their features, 
before considering  the potency of culture and civil society. It further explains the 
conditions that favour the emergence of developmental state in Botswana. The article 
will argue that the conditions that have significantly favoured Botswana‟s post-colonial 
economic success are: legitimate state-apparatus, good governance and democracy, 
commercial customs, strong property rights, and inter-ethnic harmony. The article 
concludes that the peculiar case of Botswana‟s success is not only located in its 
economic system but also, in particular, in its culture (Tswana) which was developed 
before and during the colonial period. This particular factor has significantly helped 
other factors in shaping Botswana‟s post-colonial developmental accomplishments.  
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Introduction 
The emergence of ‗developmental 
state‘ concept is as a result of the 
success of state-led development in 
the 1970s and 1980s in the East Asia 
(Woo-Cumings, 1999). It was a new 
approach in the development studies 
which challenged the dominant neo-
liberal ideas that the market was the 
sole determinant of the miraculous 
economic prosperity. Developmental 
states model was further refined to 
capture the alternative 
developmental trajectories and a 
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distinction between the socialist and 
capitalist states in the developing 
world. However, with the collapse of 
socialist system in Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union in the late 
1980s, the political and socio-
economic context within which the 
developmental stated was 
constructed and discussed changed 
dramatically. The end of the Cold 
war and intense concern about the 
resultant effects of neo-liberal 
economic policies triggerred the 
normative reassessment revolving 
around the roles of the state-led 
economic development (Howell, 
2006; White, 1998).  
 
By the mid-1990s, international 
institutions such as the World Bank, 
IMF and others acknowledged the 
pivotal role the state had played in 
the economic prosperity of the East 
Asian countries, especially the Four 
Little Tigers.  Consequently, there 
was a growing interest in ‗good 
governance‘ agenda—a relevant 
issue that was soon mirrored in aid 
programmes and analyses of 
development processes (Howell, 
2006). Nevertheless, the anticipation 
that good governance should be 
democratic and observant of human 
rights correspondingly challenged 
the idea of the developmental state, 
which in practice had proved to be 
non-democratic (authoritarian), often 
repressive of civil society, and less 
than respectful of civil and political 
rights. The intensification of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) from the 
1980s onwards led some scholars, 
such as Cerny (1997, 2000), to 
question the potency of state-led 
economic development and the 
possibility of developmental states. 
In spite of the paradoxes associated 
with the globalisation and good 
governance, the developmental states 
model continues to be advanced and 
adapted (Woo-Cummings, 1999), 
both as an empirically observed 
phenomenon and as a normative 
ideal of state-market relations. For 
example, Leftwich (2000) opened up 
a debate around democratic and non-
democratic (authoritarian) 
developmental states in developing 
world. In particular, Leftwich (Ibid.: 
177-179) places Botswana and 
Singapore in the same category as 
democratic developmental states. But 
there is a need to deepen our 
thinking about this placement of 
Botswana in the typology, as well as 
its co-location with Singapore.  
 
Furthermore, previous studies 
focused more on the understanding 
of the political, economical, financial 
and institutinal factors which 
eventually resulted in the successful 
development outcomes in the East 
Asian region (Woo-Cumings, 1999). 
Recent studies have also directed 
towards identifying the necessary 
governance, economic and social 
conditions that would make the 
implementation of the developmental 
state model feasible in African 
regions under the current global 
(political and economic) conditions 
(Musamba, 2010; Mkandawire, 
2001). However, cultural explanation 
of economic phenomena has not 
enjoyed a renaissance it deserves in 
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the development discourse.  
Therefore, this article explores the 
relevance of the developmental state 
concept to Botswana against the 
backdrop of pre-colonial culture, 
post-colonial state-led economic 
development and civil society. The 
article starts by reviewing the 
concept of the developmental state 
and why it matters in Africa, setting 
out the common characteristics of 
developmental states, examining 
conceptual underpinnings of culture 
and civil society, and analysing the 
significant conditions that favour the 
Botswana‘s economic prosperity. 
Fundamentally,the Botswana‘s case 
compels us to rethink our 
understanding of developmental 
states for Africa.  
 
Conceptualizing Developmental 
States 
Developmental states have been an 
important research focus for 
empirical analysis at different points 
in history. The historical antecedent 
of the idea of developmental state 
dates back at least to List (1909) and 
Gerschenkron (1962). They were 
concerned with the role of the state 
in rapid ‗late‘ industrialisation in 
Europe. The most recent experiences 
with successful structural 
transformations engineered by 
developmental states have been those 
in East Asia between the 1960s and 
1980s. Over the span of 30 years, a 
set of countries including Singapore, 
South Korea and Taiwan underwent 
rapid and radical economic 
development, moving from being 
poor agrarian societies in 1960s to 
producers of high technology and 
high value-added goods by the 1990s 
(Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2006; 
Kohli, 2004; Haggard, 1990). In the 
last three decades, China has also 
experienced remarkable processes of 
socio-economic transformation. In 
Africa, although limited examples 
abound, state-led development has 
been found in countries such as 
Botswana, Rwanda and Mauritius 
(Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2012; 
Rochal Menocal, 2004) 
 
More importantly, the concept of 
developmental states started to be 
defined by scholars in response to 
the explorations of economic growth 
stories of countries in East Asia, and 
this experience has tended to 
dominate its framing (Evans, 1995; 
Johnson, 1982). Johnson‘s model 
was described as a market-driven 
device that could be utilized for 
advancing a developmental agenda, 
whereby the state involved itself in 
―setting…substantive social and 
economic goals‖ (1982: 19). As Öni 
notes, ‗it is the ―synergy‖ between 
the state and the market which 
provides the basis for outstanding 
development experience‘ (1991: 
110). This challenges those who 
consider the state as being in 
disagreement with the market and 
rather points in the path of the 
successful developmental state 
(Johnson, 1999: 48).  
 
Although Johnson‘s own Japanese 
model has been challenged, the 
success of other countries in East 
Asia that used strategic interventions 
and achieved high growth periods 
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arguably establishes the 
conceptualization of ‗the 
developmental state‘ (Wade, 1990; 
Evans, 1995; Kohli, 2004). Put 
simply, Leftwich asserts that 
developmental states can be 
described as ―states whose politics 
have concentrated sufficient power, 
autonomy, capacity and legitimacy at 
the centre to shape, pursue and 
encourage the achievement of 
explicit developmental objectives, 
whether by establishing and 
promoting the conditions of 
economic growth (in the capitalist 
developmental states), or by 
organising it directly (in the 
‗socialist‘ variants), or a varying 
combination of both‖ (2000:155). 
This article will explore the 
applicability of Leftwich‘s 
explanation to concretise the case of 
Botswana in later section.  
 
Developmental state model has 
important implications for 
Mkandawire‘s formulation of an 
‗African democratic developmental 
state‘ (2001). Democratic 
developmental state is particularly 
seen as the one that ensures citizens‘ 
participation in the development and 
governance processes, with regards 
to the ideologies of electoral 
democracy. Therefore, when 
questioning how the developmental 
state can be positioned in the African 
context, it becomes imperative to 
emphasize on consensual agreement 
and deliberate traditions by bringing 
people together across party lines, 
racial backgrounds, class divides and 
other differences, for the common 
good. Conceiving the democratic 
developmental state in this way is an 
attempt to deploy ideological 
orientation, institutional architecture 
(administrative and political) and its 
policy orientation to underpin the 
realisation of developmentalist 
project. According to Edigheji 
(2010: 4), democratic developmental 
state is a state that ―could act 
authoritatively, credibly, legitimately 
and in a binding manner to formulate 
and implement its policies and 
‗developmentalist‟ programmes‖ 
(emphasis added).  
Moreover, developmental state 
model remains predominantly 
associated with East Asian states 
which have been successful in 
achieving prolonged high rates of 
growth. There has, however, been 
concern in the usefulness of the 
developmental state model for other 
regions, perhaps Africa in particular 
(Meyns and Musamba, 2010). The 
narrow regional focus of 
developmental states is contested in 
a number of ways. Mkandawire 
contends that, that the East-Asian 
model was born in the context of 
authoritarianism does not mean that 
all developmental states are 
autocratic (2001).  Other scholars 
have identified states that have been 
patrimonially developmental at 
certain times (Kelsall and Booth, 
2010; Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 
2012). Therefore, the concept of 
developmental states offers itself a 
degree of comparative investigation. 
However, a common strand by all 
these afore-mentioned scholars is 
that one-size-fits-all approach to the 
   4 
              Covenant University Journal of Politics and International Affairs (CUJPIA) Vol. 2, No. 1, June, 2014. 
construction of developmental state 
will not work because there is a need 
to take account of differences in each 
country‘s specific historical, 
political, economic, ideological and 
institutional setting1. We shall now 
turn to the characteristics of 
developmental states in the next 
section. 
 
Characterizing Developmental 
States 
Taking a departure from the previous 
section, it is less easy to specify ex 
ante the main characteristics of 
developmental states. This is because 
developmental states are marked by 
a combination of capacities, norms, 
ideologies, visions, cultural ethos 
and values. Developmental states are 
not associated with specific 
policies—at various periods and in 
various places. Different policies 
have led to social and economic 
transformations (see Woo-
Cummings, 1999). According to 
Leftwich (2000), the following 
features often characterise 
developmental states:  
 
- Developmental elites 
- Relative state autonomy 
- A powerful, competent and 
insulated bureaucracy  
                                                 
1
 This article does not focus on the 
comparative analysis of Botswana and 
Singapore in terms of the democratic 
nature of their developmental processes, 
but it contests the Leftwich’s 
classification  and co-location of 
democratic developmental states—
particularly the placement of Botswana 
and Singapore due to their developmental 
trajectory.  
- A weak civil society 
- The effective management of 
non-state economic interests 
- Legitimacy and performance.  
- Human rights records 
One can say that there appears some 
form of consensus on the features for 
successful developmental states as 
listed above. Developmental states 
are commonly characterised by 
leadership and elites who are 
strongly committed to economic 
growth and transformation, with 
power, authority and legitimacy to 
promote developmental agenda 
(Musamba, 2010; Fritz and Menocal, 
2007; Leftwich, 2000). Often 
inspired by strong nationalist spirit 
and sentiments, such elites strive to 
modernise their nations, raise 
standard of living and bridge the 
digital gap. Besides, a degree of 
political stability is usually a 
precondition for such capacities to be 
sustained and to flourish. The social 
structure of domestic demands is 
also reflected as an important feature 
of developmental state. Evans calls 
this ‗embedded autonomy‘ (1995). 
For Evans, developmental state is 
autonomous insofar as it has a 
rationalised bureaucracy 
characterised by meritocracy and 
long-term career prospects, traits that 
make civil servants more 
professional and detached from 
powerful rent-seeking groups. Thus, 
the state must be connected to a 
concrete set of social ties that bind it 
to society and provides 
institutionalised channels for the 
continual negotiation and 
renegotiation of goals and policies 
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(Ibid: 12).  A peculiar example of 
such is the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI) in Japan 
or the Economic Planning Board in 
South Korea. Both the social-
political and policy elites and 
government agencies in general are 
relatively autonomous from 
particular vested interests, allowing 
them to stand above the demands of 
specific groups, whether defined by 
class, ethnicity or region, to shape 
policy for a broader, national 
interest.  
 
Another of the underlying 
characteristics of the developmental 
states, as noted by Leftwich (2000), 
is that they tend to have weak civil 
societies, poor human rights records 
and repressive political regimes. 
Although Leftwich opened this up 
for debate by drawing a distinction 
between democratic2 developmental 
states such as Singapore, Botswana, 
Malaysia, and non-democratic 
developmental states such as China, 
South Korea (1960-1987) and 
Taiwan (up till the mid-1980s). Still, 
the only point this article would take 
issue with is the assertion (following 
Leftwich, 2000) that ‗civil society‘ is 
and remains ‗weak‘. This reflects a 
(narrow and western) 
                                                 
2  By juxtaposing the two ideas of 
democratization and development, 
Leftwich (1996: 281) critiqued the 
normative notion prevailing since the late 
1980s in development discourse that 
democratization is an essential element 
for development, rather than merely an 
end-result, and invalidates the paralytic 
idea introduced by combining the two 
processes.  
‗organisational‘ view that equates 
‗civil society‘ with NGOs. This 
article considers the usefulness of the 
concept of civil society both as an 
analytical construct and as a policy 
tool in African context. It rejects the 
Leftwich‘s argument that civil 
society is and remains weak in 
Africa‘s developmental states 
because civil society is seen as part 
of an increasingly universal 
negotiation between citizens, states 
and markets. There are even some 
modifications to Leftwich‘s 
argument. For example, Woom-
Cumings (1999), argues that the 
developmental state is not an 
imperious entity lording it over 
society but a social partner with the 
business sector in a historical 
compact of industrial development. 
Similar notions include the concept 
of ‗embedded autonomy‘ and 
‗governed interdependence (Evans, 
1995; Weiss, 1998). Although these 
modifications are essential, they 
attest to the fact that in both 
democratic and non-democratic 
developmental state regimes 
institutionalise state-society were 
largely confined to interest groups 
perceived by the state as important to 
the attainment of set productive 
goals. All this has significant 
governance implications, especially 
with regards to the representation, 
consultation, oversight and 
participation of non-economic 
factors (Mkandawire, 2005).  We 
shall return to the conceptualisation 
of civil society later but for now it 
becomes imperative to state that civil 
society, in the analysis of 
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development trajectory of some 
African countries, has a capacity to 
inspire action (for critical details, see 
Lewis, 2002).  
 
Developmental states are also 
defined by legitimacy and achieved 
outcomes towards the improvement 
of standard of living for a broad 
cross-section of society (Lin and 
Monga, 2011; Fritz and Menocal, 
2007; Wade, 1990). Developmental 
states deliver speedy growth, as well 
as general well-being, measured in 
terms of literacy, employment, health 
status, life expectancy, per capita 
income and industrialisation. All 
these social indicators imply that the 
performance of developmental states 
is striking because they demonstrate 
a capacity to combine economic 
growth with good ingredients of 
redistribution. For example, there 
was thorough increased employment 
and industrialisation in the case of 
East Asia and Mauritius. However, 
the caveat here is that emphasis 
being placed on these various aspects 
varies between scholars, and indeed 
scholars usually focus on different 
elements—growth, standard of living 
and legitimacy—at different 
junctures.  
 
In the later section, the article will 
further examine whether or not any 
features of the developmental states, 
as highlighted by Leftwich above 
and as advanced by other scholars 
has any purchase in the case of 
Botswana. By examining Botswana, 
this article is not seeking to privilege 
Botswana over others in Sub-
Saharan Africa, though the track 
record of Botswana in particular 
does stand out in the continent.   
 
Conceptual Discourses: Culture 
and Civil Society 
What we try to do in this section is to 
set out conceptual explanations about 
the culture and civil society because 
they are relevant to the case of 
Botswana:  
 
Culture 
Several economists often feel 
reluctant to reckon with the role that 
culture plays for two cogent reasons; 
because of the several channels 
through which culture can affect, and 
be affected by, economic outcomes; 
and because culture ―has a sulphuric 
odour of race and inheritance, an air 
of immutability‖ (Landes, 2000: 2). 
Preferences and beliefs are taken as 
given in the neoclassical economics‘ 
sphere; however scholars in the 
mainstream economics have now 
joined the economic historians who 
have traditionally been less doubtful 
of cultural assumptions (see Miguel, 
2004; Fernandez and Fogli, 2006). 
For Landes (1998), economies make 
significant progress (or fail) as a 
result of attitudes driven by cultural 
factors and concludes that ―if we 
learn anything from the history of 
economic development, it is that 
culture makes all the difference‖ 
(p.516).  
 
A general definition of culture is: 
―The system of shared beliefs, 
values, customs, behaviours, and 
artifacts that the members of society 
use to cope with their world and with 
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one another, and that are transmitted 
from generation to generation 
through learning‖ (Bates and Plog, 
1991: 7). Recognising differences 
between culture and institutions is 
often challenging. In some African 
countries, if not all, culture seems to 
have influence on economic 
outcomes as a transmission 
mechanism from historical pre-
colonial to post-colonial institutions. 
Etounga-Manguelle (2000: 75), for 
example, argued that ―culture is the 
mother….and institutions are the 
children‖. As Hjort (2010: note 6b) 
opines, ―culture is more of a midwife 
for institutions‖, although it is 
certainly not the only transmission 
mechanism.  In the world of culture, 
the real is more apparent than 
tautology. This is because cultural 
exchanges are made manifest and so 
reversely changed into the sphere of 
politics across the axes of everyday 
life. Tacit in all these are discourses 
of mainly evaluation expressed, 
alliances and antagonisms, support 
and opposition which tend to be 
articulated around identifiable 
dissenting groups (Comaroff and 
Comaroff, 1997). All in all, there is 
much more to the substance and 
dynamics of culture--both past and 
present—because it helps us to make 
sense of contemporary discourses of 
development outcomes and the 
postcolonial politics of nation-states.  
 
Civil Society 
Civil society can be generally 
defined as ―the population of groups 
formed for collective purposes 
primarily outside of the State and 
marketplace‖ (van Rooy, 1998: 30). 
Traditionally, civil society is rooted 
with different ideas. Ferguson 
(1767/1995), for example, saw civil 
society as a socially desirable 
alternative both to the state of nature 
and the heightened individualism of 
emergent capitalism. While Hegel 
(1821/1991) argued that self-
organised civil society is needed to 
be balanced and ordered by the state, 
otherwise it would become self-
centred and would not contribute to 
the common good. These two ideas 
shaped how the concept of civil 
society was evolved.  Moving from 
the social and political terrain to a 
narrower organisational lens, De 
Tocqueville‘s positive account of 
19th century associationism in the 
U.S. laid emphasis on volunteerism, 
community spirit and independent 
association of life as protections 
against the domination of society by 
the state, and as an offset which 
helped to make the government 
accountable and effective. This De 
Tocqueville‘s account and elements 
of those which preceded it tended to 
underline the role of civil society as 
one in which some of kind of 
evenness was created in relation to 
the state and the market (Lewis, 
2002).   
 
Other important issues that are often 
marked in civil society discourse are: 
fragility/ weakness of civil society 
(Putnam 2000; Leftwich, 2000), and 
the historical specificity of civil 
society which is rooted in the 
Western European experience and 
which perhaps have only limited 
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applicability to non-Western 
contexts (Blaney and Pasha, 1993). 
The two issues were revealed in 
Brown‘s (2000) account of civil 
society as an unjustified, time-bound 
idea which first developed from a 
different ‗historical moment‘ in the 
particular areas of Western Europe 
during the late 18th century. During 
this period, state became strong 
enough to maintain law and order but 
not so resilient to become 
repressive—a balance which Brown 
(2000:8) argues was crucial:  
 
There is very little margin 
for error—if the state is too 
expensive it will strangle 
civil society at birth, too 
weak and private institution 
will compete for its role as 
provider of order, if people 
are too much involved in 
each other‘s lives then they 
will lose the sense of 
distance needed to preserve 
civility, too little involved 
and they become part of an 
atomized ‗mass society‘.  
 
Such ideas, during the past decade, 
tend to promote democratic 
institutions and market reforms in 
developing world. This is what is 
tagged ‗good governance‘ agenda 
which was prominent in the early 
1990s and which suggested a 
‗virtuous circle‘ could be constructed 
between the state, economy and civil 
society which balanced growth, 
equity and stability (Archer, 1994). 
Much of the recent interest in civil 
society is clearly associated with the 
global dominance of neo-liberal 
beliefs during the past decade which 
suggested a declined role for the 
state and privatised forms of services 
delivery through flexible 
combinations of governmental, non-
governmental and private 
institutional actors (Lewis, 2002). 
Another different notion of civil 
society has been influenced by 
Gramsci (1971), who argued that 
civil society is the arena, separate 
from state and market, in which 
ideological hegemony is contested. 
The implication of this is that civil 
society consists of a broad range of 
various organisations and ideologies 
which both challenge and uphold the 
existing order. These ideologies were 
influential in the context of the 
analysis of resistance to totalitarian 
regimes in Eastern Europe and Latin 
America from the 1970s onwards. 
The foregoing ideas can also be 
linked to the research on ‗social 
movements‘ which seeks to 
challenge and transform structures 
and identities (Howell and Pearce, 
2001; Escobar and Alvarez, 1992).  
 
In spite of the differing ideas of the 
concept of civil society, either 
fragile, historically specific or 
Gramscian, the concept is ridden 
with ambiguities in both Western 
and non-Western contexts (see 
Kaviraj and Khilnani, 2001; Hann 
and Dunn, 1996). However, if we 
move on to consider African 
contexts, differences of culture, 
history and politics will polarise its 
usefulness (See Comaroff and 
Comaroff, 1999; Lewis, 2002). 
Amidst all different ideas of civil 
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society, the present article takes a 
clue from the adaptive view which 
considers the importance of the 
localised, cultural and flexible 
different meanings of the concept of 
civil society, either at the level of 
analysis or in the implementation of 
policy. Maina (1998), for example, 
argues that such an idea can be 
indispensable if it is adapted in 
different ways. In particular, he 
suggests that it should be moved 
away from a Western obsession with 
rights and advocacy to include ‗self-
help groups‘ (organisations founded 
on a strong mistrust of the state and 
the overcoming of civic apathy) that 
are organised for personal and 
economic ends. A plethora of cases 
of Maina‘s account in Africa 
abounds (see Gibbon, 2001—
Tanzanian case; Brehony, 2000—
Ugandan case; Honey and Okafor, 
1998—Nigerian case).  
 
Therefore, the need to think more 
broadly about the organisational and 
the moral values of civil society in 
African contexts align with 
Comaroffs‘ (1999: 22) position: 
there is an ―Eurocentric tendency to 
limit civil society to a narrowly 
defined institutional arena‖ which 
runs counter to the earlier ideas. 
Also, Lewis (2002:579) notes that: 
 
  There may be partisan, 
parochial or 
fundamentalist 
organisations each with a 
claim on civil society 
roles and membership. 
Recognition of local 
counterpart traditions may 
therefore counter the 
tendency to undervalue 
the role of kin-based and 
ethnic organisations in 
helping to form public 
opinions and political 
pressure groups. The 
changing role of tradition 
in helping to structure 
different forms of African 
civil society is also 
important. 
With this perspective above, there 
are possible dangers of moving from 
prescription into an equally 
unhelpful position of cultural 
relativism with the understanding of 
what civil society really means.  For 
example, if it is widened to include 
kin groups, it is a long way from 
Gellner‘s (1995) argument that civil 
society should not only be seen in 
terms of balancing the state, but is 
also a counter-balance to what he 
terms the ‗tyranny of cousins‘. 
Although the concept of civil society 
allows us to connect local and 
international perspectives of political 
struggle, Mamdani (1996) and 
Ferguson (1998) show how the 
concept tells more about the risks of 
over-simplification of the horizontal 
transnational identities and linkages. 
In spite of the conceptual 
ambiguities which lie at the heart of 
the idea of civil society, an adaptive 
and historically contextualised view 
appears to be more useful to the 
present case study because it is 
linked to wider structural changes 
and state transformation.  And it has 
become part of the political and 
social discourse of a wide range of 
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organised groups and individuals 
with the means to rethink politics 
and development under conditions of 
global change, either in Africa or 
elsewhere. Overall, civil society in 
Africa can be ambiguous, and as an 
‗all-purpose placeholder‘ (Comaroff 
and Comaroff, 1999:3) it can take 
cognisance of the emerging 
aspirations in the context of local 
social struggles for social well-being, 
and global socio-economic and 
technological transformations.   
 
Botswana as Developmental State: 
Conditions that Favour its 
Emergence 
Upon Botswana‘s independence in 
1966, it was one of the poorest 
countries in the world with a GDP 
per capital of $69 (Acemoglu et al., 
2003). The Botswana Democratic 
Party (BDP), then led by Seretse 
Khama and based on support from 
both the rural poor and the elite, won 
the first election and has reigned ever 
since (Hjort, 2010). The 
transformation that began in the mid-
1960s was successful though, the 
cattle economy expanded swiftly, 
and it then seemed that Botswana 
was moving down a different track 
than its neighbours; it was not until 
the revenues from the newly 
discovered diamond deposits started 
flowing in the early 1970s that the 
Botswana‘s economic miracle truly 
took off (Good, 1992). Though as an 
exporter of quality diamonds since 
1970s, Botswana has its structural 
problems, still it has experienced 
limited symptoms as opposed to 
other African countries with mineral 
resources (Hjort, 2006; Leith, 2005). 
Evidences from the post-
independence experiences in Africa 
show that Botswana‘s development 
accomplishment is indeed an 
exceptional one (Leith, 2005). 
Hence, attempting to account for 
conditions that favour Botswana‘s 
relative post-colonial economic 
success is what this section will turn 
to next.   
 
Botswana‘s capacity to adopt 
growth-enhancing policies derived 
from their legitimacy, which in turn 
was due to a connection with 
traditional authorities, resulted in 
how Botswana developed an 
integrative social and political 
structure for their developmentalism 
(Robinson and Parsons, 2006; 
Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007). The 
ascendancy of the first BDP 
government represented the way the 
post-colonial power structure in 
Botswana was based on Tswana 
culture (Hjort, 2010). For example, 
when the BDP was established in 
1962, ―it was clearly identified as the 
party of chiefs and therefore the 
inheritor of their legitimacy and 
institutions‖ (Maudeni, 2002:125). 
The uniqueness of Botswana is that 
the first government, consisting of 
farmer-politicians whose interests 
were closely aligned with those of 
the majority, contrasted with the 
condition of most contemporary 
African countries where leadership 
was in the hands of urban elites 
(Good, 1992). In most African states, 
colonialism gradually battered the 
pre-colonial political institutions to 
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shape the power structures of their 
subordinates, in an attempt to 
shrewdly extract the resources of 
their territories (most economically), 
thereby prohibiting the ex-colonies 
of the 1960s and 1970s from basing 
their new states on the existing 
traditions. However, in Botswana, 
the Tswana chiefdoms had cemented 
highly centralized bureaucratic state 
structures and a nationalistic culture 
(Molutsi, 1989). Thus, the BDP and 
economic elites based the 
administrative system on these pre-
existing culture(s), thereby 
legitimizing the state and furthering 
the institutionalization of the BDP 
governments to invest in state 
capacity in order to articulate a 
national vision for development 
(Poteete, 2009). Thus, Botswana 
then typifies the developmental state 
of Chalmers Johnson where ‗the 
politicians reign and the state 
bureaucrats rule‘ (Johnson 1981: 12).  
 
Botswana has also unfailingly been 
scoring high on indices of 
democracy, governance, government 
effectiveness and control of 
corruption as opposed to other 
African countries (World Bank, 
2002; World Bank, 2005; Poteete, 
2009). That the opposition parties 
have, however, closed in on the 
ruling party (BDP) in recent 
elections, perhaps show a sign of the 
vitality of Botswana‘s democracy 
(Leith, 2005). That the public is able 
to hold Botswana‘s leaders 
accountable is clear; a point strongly 
accentuated by Acemoglu et al. 
(2003) that the BDP has been 
responsive to the threat of losing 
power, and the courts have on 
several occasions declared specific 
government actions illegal. 
Botswana‘s economic success can be 
attributed to good governance 
(Colclough and McCarthy, 1980). 
The political institutions, hugely 
different from those of most 
neighbouring states that developed in 
Botswana after independence, 
suggests that exceptionally proto-
democratic traditions may have 
favoured its emergence. The contrast 
with the histories of its neighbours 
(e.g. South Africa, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe and Mozambique) could 
not be simpler (Hjort, 2010). 
Besides, Botswana‘s modern 
parliamentary system is rooted in her 
cultural history of consensual politics 
(P.Peters, cited in Good, 1992). 
Though democracy has been deficit 
in Sub-Saharan Africa; all regions of 
the continent have until recently 
been dominated by coups, civil war 
and autocracy. Botswana‘s thriving 
democracy is thus a different one 
that is rooted in her history and 
culture—with certain features in 
common with western democracy 
(Leith, 2005), and ―reveals a clear 
continuity between postcolonial 
leaders and pre-colonial rulers as 
traditional patterns of politics 
influenced by the nature of the 
postcolonial state itself‖ (Gennaioli 
and Rainer, 2007: 197). The culture 
of consultation sustained in the past, 
is still apparent in Botswana‘s 
current political system. Policy 
proposals, for example, are 
circulated for comment among all 
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relevant ministries and only after an 
inter-ministerial consensus has been 
reached will a memorandum go 
forward to the Cabinet. The strong 
political checks and balances present 
in Botswana encouraged competent 
leadership, and the quality of 
Botswana‘s leaders has been 
noteworthy (Samatar, 1999).  
 
Moreover, respect for private 
property rights is another condition. 
The individualization of cattle 
ownership, for example, facilitated 
the development of a market cattle 
economy in Botswana during the 20
th
 
century (Hjort, 2010). The 
justification for this, establishes a 
strong appreciation of the eventual 
gains of private property rights. 
Africa‘s poverty is attributed, in part, 
to its history of communal 
ownership, and in particular the 
deficiency of individual property 
rights that characterise many tribal 
societies (de Soto, 2000). Still, 
Botswana established an individual 
thought of ownership centred on 
cattle during the 19
th
 century based 
on its pre-colonial social norms 
(Acemoglu et al. 2001). Approved 
by Botswana customs and prompted 
by market ideologies, social 
amenities such as boreholes began to 
be recognised as personal property in 
the 1930s, and moves towards the 
private ownership of grazing lands 
and dams as well in the post-colonial 
period (Good, 1992). In this way, the 
autonomy of Botswana‘s 
bureaucracy was socially anchored 
within the wider setting of webs and 
networks that connected the cattle-
ranchers, politicians and bureaucrats 
together. It can be argued further that 
the embedded autonomy of the 
bureaucracy and different viable 
agencies (especially Ministry of 
Finance and Development Planning, 
Civil service etc) have served 
Botswana well; cushioning policy 
from special-interest lobbying, 
though perhaps at a cost of the 
democratic traditions (Edigheji, 
2005; Acemoglu et al, 2002).  
 
Besides, there has been minimal 
opposition to the dominant elites‘ 
programmes in Botswana by the fact 
that civil society has been poorly 
developed and weak (Leftwich, 
2000; Putnam, 2000)—an 
application of Western‘s universal 
logic. BDP has enjoyed 
supremacy—if not exclusively 
unchallenged status since 
independence. This typical nature of 
‗embedded autonomy‘ of 
developmental states (Evans, 1995; 
2010), established a powerful 
interaction between the various 
groups that supported the private 
property rights favourable not only 
to the elites themselves but also to 
development. This has been 
facilitated because there was 
minimal opposition to the dominant 
elites‘ programmes in Botswana by 
the fact that civil society has been 
disorganised and democratic input 
has been weak (Molutsi and Holm, 
1990). During this period, BDP 
enjoyed hegemonic status and 
became strong because civil society 
mobilisation was negligible, 
subordinate, increasingly facing 
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challenges of internal transformation 
(Ose-Hwedie, 2001; Mokopakgosi 
and Molomo, 2000), and perhaps 
was considered to be economically 
unproductive.  However, the efforts 
of elite-assisted civil society actors 
to develop more autonomous ‗room 
for manoeuvre‘ should not be ruled 
out. Rwanda‘s post-colonial 
developmental trajectory appears to 
be relevant to this claim (see Booth 
and Golooba-Mutebi, 2012; 
Purdekova, 2011).  
 
Furthermore, the first president of 
Botswana (Seretse Khama), and his 
broad political coalitions (in BDP) 
followed a sound party programme 
that appealed both to the economic 
elites and the majority of Botswana. 
Despite Botswana‘s structural 
imbalances, it has thus far avoided or 
limited them (Samatar, 1999; Leith, 
2005). Botswana‘s economic and 
political vulnerability to South 
Africa, especially during the 
apartheid era, reinforced the 
importance of unity and bolstered 
support for the BDP (Molomo, 
2000). The BDP‘s electoral alliance 
brought together groups with 
potentially incongruent interests by 
building on economic 
interdependencies, bringing in 
potential rivals, and ostracizing 
radical challengers. BDP further 
formed a broad electoral alliance by 
appealing to exporters of livestock 
producers and consumers of imports, 
investing mineral revenues for 
national development, and appealing 
to very real international threats to 
marginalise radical domestic parties 
(Acemoglu et al., 2001). 
Providentially, the diamond revenues 
that started flowing in the 1970s 
drove Botswana‘s growth rates into 
double figures. Manufacturing has 
constituted around 5 per cent of GDP 
throughout the history of 
independent Botswana— ‗quite an 
achievement‘ (Acemoglu et al. 
(2003). The government played an 
important role in kick-starting 
Botswana‘s economy, but in the 
1980s and 1990s the degree of 
central planning was gradually 
reduced, and private commerce and 
entrepreneurship flourished. 
Botswana government has not been 
shying away from an active 
involvement in promoting the 
market. Pilot institutions have been 
built to stimulate growth in the 
private sector—for example, the 
Botswana Development Corporation, 
was saddled with the responsibility 
of providing financial assistance to 
investors with commercially viable 
projects, building partnerships with 
investors capable of creating and 
growing commercial viable business 
and supporting projects that generate 
sustainable employment for 
Botswana. By the 1980s, as many 
African states continued to 
experiment with import substitution 
and quasi-socialism, commerce and 
entrepreneurialism flourished in 
Botswana (Robinson and Parsons, 
2006).  
 
Given the potency of ethnic 
fractionalization in development, the 
absence of ethnic conflict in 
Botswana is arguably one of the 
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country‘s biggest advantages over 
almost all other African countries 
(Ibid.). Though Tswana culture is 
clearly dominant in Botswana, the 
country has always been ethnically 
diverse. For example, the damaging 
effects that ethnic conflict can have 
on the political economy of a country 
have been avoided, even though 
Botswana is ethnically diverse. 
Besides, the dominant Tswana tribes 
cooperated to an extraordinary 
degree before, during, and after 
colonialism (Hjort, 2010). The 
absence of ethnic war in 
contemporary Botswana that 
contrasts with the experience of 
nearly all sub-Saharan African 
countries appears to be due in part to 
the integrative nature of Tswana 
culture developed before and during 
colonial period, which encouraged 
the alliance of both Tswana tribes 
and non-Tswana minorities in tribal 
life (Ibid.). Robinson and Parsons 
(2006) argue that Botswana was the 
only African nation that was 
dominated by such a homogenizing 
force at the time of independence. 
Though the unusual and limited 
nature of colonial rule seems to have 
further strengthened inter-ethnic 
unity in Botswana, Samatar argues 
that the cooperation existing across 
Tswana tribes and the inclusion of 
non-Tswana minorities in tribal life 
―sowed the seed of contemporary 
Botswana national identity‖ 
(1999:7). Although the Tswana 
tribes are relatively culturally 
homogenous, modern-day Botswana 
has been an ethnically diverse 
territory. The non-existence of ethnic 
conflict in Botswana, which appears 
to have muffled growth elsewhere in 
Africa (Easterly and Levine, 1997), 
cannot be considered as an 
exogenous factor but should be 
explained in any satisfactory account 
of Botswana‘s economic success. In 
helping to forge a national identity 
and restraining ethnic conflict in a 
diverse country, Tsana culture 
clearly facilitated Botswana‘s 
economic success.  
 
Overall, the juxtaposition of the 
conditions above-mentioned has 
accounted for the profile of 
Botswana‘s economic success as a 
democratic developmental state in 
Africa.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
This article supports the view that 
developmental states, whether 
democratic or autocratic, go through 
a life span that begins with origins, 
progresses through alliance and 
continues with social transformation, 
in promoting economic growth 
(Leftwich, 2000). Botswana‘s 
success is based on a foundation of 
market principles in which the state, 
through a wide variety of incentives 
and interventions, actively promotes 
private investments and direct 
investments by viable national 
institutions (Taylor, 2005). All this 
has been facilitated by legitimate 
state apparatus, strong inter-tribal 
harmony among others. Though 
Botswana has faced serious problems 
related to structural imbalances, 
equity within the society and 
political vulnerabilities (Good, 1992; 
Taylor, 2005), it has been able to 
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avoid or limit them (Poteete, 2009). 
Thus, the primacy of politics in the 
complex process of development has 
been central to Botswana case 
(Leftwich, 2000).  
 
The understanding that an important 
transmission mechanism from 
historical to current institutions is 
‗culture‘ as it has shown in the 
democratic template of Botswana 
(Acemoglu et al., 2001; Evans, 
1995). From a Sub-Saharan 
viewpoint, traditional Botswana 
culture proved uniquely beneficial to 
economic development after 
colonialism in the presence of a 
market system and prolific 
opportunities. That is, Botswana 
developed a culture (Tswana) before 
and during the early days of 
colonialism with features similar to 
those of the developed countries 
which scholars frequently emphasize 
as possible explanations why, for 
example, the industrial revolution 
started in Europe, when the required 
technology was in place (Temin, 
1997). Unlike Botswana, a legitimate 
state apparatus, good governance, 
commercial traditions, stable 
property rights, and a national 
harmony were initially not in place 
in other Sub-Saharan African states 
to a degree required for market 
system to work effectively (Samatar, 
1999; Good, 1992). While not over-
generalizing on the foundation of 
this case study, we can perhaps learn 
from the dominant Botswana culture 
(Tswana) that proved distinctively 
complementary to the western-style 
capitalism and governance.  
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